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Macro-Financial Linkages: Implications or
Monetary and Financial System Stability
Frank Chikezie*
Abstract
Monetary and financial stability are of central importance to the effective functioning of a
market economy. They provide the basis for rational decision-making about the allocation of
resources through time and therefore, improve the climate for savings and investment. The
absence of stability creates damaging uncertainties that could lead to misallocation of
resources and reduce the willingness to enter into inter-temporal contracts. In extreme cases,
disruptions in the financial sector can have severe adverse effects on economic activity. Thus,
maintaining stability is a key objective of monetary authorities.
In this paper, the implications of macro-financial linkages for monetary and financial system
stability were examined. Based on the flow of income model and the contingent claim analysis
(CCA) framework, the paper established major linkages among the four sectors of the
economy. These linkages, which are built on the contingent claims of each sector on the other,
create the economic balance sheet of the sectors, demonstrating the interdependence
among the sectors. Based on these structures and linkages, the vulnerability and excess buildup in the financial sector and institutions could affect the wider economy, with some
devastating impacts. By the same token, the health of the financial sector could be severely
tested by the developments in the economy. These two way macro-financial linkages create
potentially dangerous mechanism that could trigger deep and long-lasting economic
downturns without rapid and effective policy intervention. The paper recommends the
adoption of macro-prudential policy to address systemic risks generated by macro-financial
linkages. The paper also recommends that financial institutions should be prevented from
becoming too connected to fail.

Keywords: Monetary Policy, Financial Stability, Macro-financial linkages, Monetary
policy transmission channels, Micro-prudential policy, Macro-prudential policy,
Systemic risk, Interconnectedness.
I.

Introduction

A

nalysis of macro-financial linkages provides a powerful framework for
analysing risk and vulnerability in economies and for estimating the
economic value of the risks posed by inter-linkages between sectors, as well
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as the risk of default of different sectors and markets, and the real economy on their
outstanding debt obligations. Thus, an understanding of the linkages between the
financial sector and the macro-economy, and the mechanisms through which
financial regulation can help to stabilise the economic and financial system by
financial policy makers will facilitate the effective formulation, design and
implementation of financial stability and monetary policies.
In the last few years, efforts to review monetary and financial stability policies have
focused attention on the interaction between the financial system and the macroeconomy. The 2007-2008 global financial crisis demonstrated that the weaknesses in
the financial system could have sudden and long-lasting macroeconomic effects.
This paper therefore focuses on the following objectives:
·
To understand the components of the financial system and the macroeconomy, and how they interact and influence the overall behaviour of
the economy, including all intermediaries, markets and infrastructures
underpinning them;
·
To gain a truly systemic perspective of the financial system, including large
and complex financial institutions;
·
To understand the likelihood of the failure, and the costs, of a significant
portion of the financial system arising from systemic risks; and
·
To understand how important the individual viability and the multiple
connections of large and complex financial institutions to other
intermediaries and markets are for systemic stability, and therefore, for
macro-prudential risk assessments and policies.
This paper is structured into two parts. Section I discuss the structure of the macroeconomy and the financial industry, and the interactions between monetary policy
and the financial system. The section also showed how monetary policy could create
the condition for financial stability.
Section 2, on the other hand, discuss the implications of macro-financial linkages for
monetary and financial system stability with emphasis on how the new credit risk
transfer mechanism (securitisation and derivatives) had altered the nature of some
macro-financial linkages, with considerable policy implications. The section
concluded by referring to the new direction of macro-prudential regulation and the
tools for managing risks created by macro-financial linkages. Reference was also
made to the recent subprime financial crisis that started in the US economy with
lessons for emerging market economies, such as Nigeria.
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Why Macro-financial Linkages?

Macro-financial linkages, as the term implies, refer to the interaction between the
financial sector and the macro-economy. These linkages exist in the form of
mechanisms that transmit the impact of macroeconomic activities to the financial
sector and vice versa. It is known that vulnerabilities and excess build-up in financial
markets and institutions can affect the wider economy, with sometimes devastating
results. By the same token, the health of the financial sector can be severely tested by
developments elsewhere in the economy. In fact, these two-way macro-financial
linkages often create potentially dangerous feedback mechanisms that trigger long
lasting economic downturns without rapid and effective policy intervention.
Financial market activities and transactions create reasonable amount of risks to the
economy. Whereas the risk-taking behaviour of the participants drives the market
performance, the risks become issues when they lead to excesses. Despite the high
level of regulation of the financial system, there is still a lot to learn about the
behaviour of financial institutions and their effects on systemic risks and the real
economy. The ability to model the channels by which disruptions in credit and
finance affect the real economy and the ways these effects transmit into the banking
and financial system has become very sophisticated. Yet, our understanding of the
key channels, their quantitative importance and the effects of policies for managing
them, remain very important.
The overall objective of macro-financial linkage analysis is to analyse the impact of
shocks, both domestic and external, on the macro-economy, using a framework
based on the analysis of risk-adjusted and interlinked balance sheets of the major
economic sectors. The framework measures non-linear risk transmission between the
domestic economy and the global economy.

II.

Structure of the Macro-economy and the Financial System.

A healthy and vibrant economy requires a dynamic financial system that moves
funds from people who save to people who have productive investment
opportunities. The financial system is structured as part of the macro-economy so as
to promote economic efficiency. Financial systems are fragile and vulnerable to
crisis. When a country's financial system collapses, its economy goes with it. In
particular, when government oversight fails, the cost can be enormous.
One basic way to visualise the macro-financial linkages is to consider the circular flow
of income model in Figures 1-4. Figure 1 shows the circular flow of income and
product with a credit market, government, and a foreign sector. Households supply
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factors of production (land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship) to businesses
(firms), and purchase goods and services from the firms. Firms buy these factors of
production and supply goods and services. In the product market, goods are
exchanged; and in the factor market, factors of production (resources) are
exchanged.
The factor market shows the flow of incomes received by households in the form of
rent, wages, interest and profit, for the use of the four factors of production. The
product market shows the flow of goods and services produced. The credit market
allows savings (non-consumptions) by households to be converted into investment
funds for firms. These investment funds are then spent on goods and services
produced by firms. The government buys goods and services produced by firms and
also buy factors of production from households by paying rent, interest, wage and
profits. In addition, government reduces households' consumption by taxing the
incomes of households. If government spends more than its taxes, thereby running a
deficit, it must borrow the needed funds from the credit markets. Thus, government
enters the circular flow of income and product model at a number of points. It takes
funds out of the stream by taxing households and by borrowing from credit markets. It
adds to the flow by purchasing goods and services from firms (see Figure 3).

Figure 1: Circular Flow of Income and Product
PRODUCT MARKET

Source: Amacher and Ulbrich, 1986.
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The last sector in the model is the foreign sector (Figure 4). A foreign sector allows the
households to purchase from, and sell goods and services to, firms outside the country.
The purchases from foreign firms are called imports, while goods and services sold to
foreign buyers are called exports. As evident in Figure 1, the circular flow of income
model of the aggregate economy emphasises output and income and their
components.
Figure 2: Circular Flow of Funds with a Credit Market

Source: Amacher and Ulbrich, 1986.

Figure 3: Circular Flow of Income and Product with a Credit
Market and Government

Source: Amacher and Ulbrich, 1986.
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Figure 4: Circular Flow of Funds with Government and a Foreign Sector

Source: Amacher and Ulbrich, 1986.

II.1

The Role of the Financial Market (Credit Market)

Financial institutions (FIs) perform special function or services to the economy. Any
major disturbances to, or interferences with, these functions can lead to adverse
effects on the rest of the economy. Financial institutions fulfill two basic functions,
namely, brokerage and asset-transformation. In the brokerage function, a FI acts as
an agent for the savers in providing information and transaction services. By this
service, the FI plays an extremely important role by reducing transaction and
information costs or imperfections between households and corporation. In assettransformation, FIs purchase the financial claims issued by corporations' equities,
bonds, and other debt claims called primary securities –and finance these purchases
by selling financial claims to households' investors and other sectors in the form of
deposits, insurance policies, and so on. The financial claims of FIs may be considered
secondary securities because these assets are backed by the primary securities
issued by commercial corporations that in turn invest in real assets (see figure 5)
The financial claims issued by FIs are more attractive than the ones used by
corporation due to lower monitoring costs, lower liquidity costs and lower price risk.
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Figure 5: Flow of Funds in a world with Financial Institutions

FI
Brokers

Households

Cash

FI
(Asset –
transformers)

Deposit and
Insurance Policies

Corporations

Equity and debt

Cash

Source: Saunders A., 1997.

By playing these roles, FIs contribute to higher production and efficiency in the overall
economy. Figure 6 shows the two major processes by which funds are channeled
from savers to those who have productive investment opportunities. Funds can flow
from the savers direct to the users under direct finance channel when savers benefit
directly in corporate sector investments. But when funds flow from the savers to the
users through the financial intermediaries (a process called financial intermediation),
it is said to be done through an indirect finance channel.
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Figure 6: Flow of Funds through the Financial System

INDIRECT FINANCE
Financial
Intermediaries

FUNDS

FUNDS

FUNDS

Lenders (Savers)
1. Households
2. Business firms
3. Government

FUNDS

Financial
Markets

FUNDS

Borrowers (Spenders)
1. Households
2. Business firms
3. Government
4. Foreigners

DIRECT FINANCE
Source: Frederic S. Mishkin, 1992.

II.2

Linkages in a Simple Four-Sector Framework

From the four-sector macro-finance model (flow of income model) shown in figures 14, we can define the contingent claim in each sector that demonstrates the
interdependence among sectors. As we noted, the corporate sector borrows from
banks (financial market) through loans and other forms of credits. The bank loans are
the liabilities of the corporate sector, which are the assets of the banking sector. The
banking sector also includes guarantees from the government as an asset, which is a
liability to the government. The system's financial stability depends on the
government's financial guarantee to the banks. The corporate sectors liability
includes primary securities such as equity. The banking sector liabilities include
deposits and equity. The assets of the household sector are made up of real estate
and durables, present value of labour income and financial assets, which are
liabilities to the banking sector. Household liabilities include real estate debts
(mortgages which are borrowed from the banks), consumption as “dividend” and
net worth. The assets of the government (public sector) include foreign reserves, net
fiscal asset and value of monopoly on issue of money. The liabilities of the public
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sector include financial guarantee, foreign debt and base money and local currency
debt.
These linkages built on the contingent claims of each sector on the other create the
economic balance sheet of the sectors, which demonstrates the interdependence
among sectors. The patterns of value and default corrections across different asset
classes, sectors and foreign debt values depend on these structures and links, unique
to a particular economy.
Table 1:Balance Sheet of a Simple Four-sector Framework

Asset
Corporate assets

Corporate sector balance sheet
Liabilities
Debt (=Default -free value of debt minus
implicit put option)
Equity (implicit call option)

Banking sector balance sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Loans (debt of corporate sector)
Debt
Other assets
Deposits
Financial guarantee (implicit put option)
Equity (implicit call option)
Household sector balance sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Real estate and durables
Debt (real estate and durables)
Financial assets
Consumption as “dividend”
Present value (PV) of labour income
Net worth of households
Public sector balance sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Foreign reserves
Financial guarantee (implicit put option)
Net fiscal asset and other assets
Foreign debt (default - free value of debt
minus implicit put option)
Value of monopoly on issue of money
Base money and local currency debt
(implicit call options)
Source: Gray and Malone, 2008.

II.3

Risk Transmission among Sectors

We can use the four-sector framework to explain how the risks inherent in the
interactions between the sectors can be transmitted from one sector to the other. The
framework can also be used to show how the risk-transmission patterns can be
dampened or magnified depending on the capital structure of the sectors and the
linkages. When shocks affect the corporate sector, for example, the shocks feed into
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the financial sector and could transmit risk to the government. These are explained in the
sections below.
II.3.1 Risk Transmission from the Corporate Sector to the Banking Sector and to the
Government
The corporate sector's financial distress – possibly caused by stock market declines
which reduce the value of corporate assets, recession, commodity prices drops, or
excessive unhedged foreign debt accompanied by currency devaluation – can be
transmitted to the financial sector.
Corporate sector

Banking sector

Government

The four-sector framework shows how the risk can be transmitted from the corporate
sector to the banking sector and to the public sector through implicit and explicit
guarantees. An example of a negative shock to the corporate sector is a drop in the
assets as a result of recession; equity sell-offs; the combination of currency devaluation;
and foreign debt that is not hedged. The value of the assets of the corporate sector
declines. So does the value of the debt (and equity), which leads to a decline in bank
assets and an increase in the implicit government guarantee. As the corporate assets
decline, the government guarantees to the banking sector increase in a nonlinear way.
II.3.2 Risk Transmission from Banking Sector to the Government
The banking sector's financial distress, such as systemic banking crisis, due to deposit runs
and a decline in asset value or mismanagement can be transmitted to the government
through guarantees.
Banking sector

Government

Risk in the banking sector due to financial distress (e.g. from bad loans, deposit run or
mismanagement) means that the banking sector's implicit put option rises and this could
lead to large increase in the implicit guarantee provided for the government. In the case
of a systemic banking crisis, the government is most likely to provide guarantees. The cost
of such crises to the government can be quite large, up to 30-50% of GDP in extreme
cases.
II.3.3 Risk transmission from the Government to the Banks and Feedback
The public sector's financial distress or default can transmit risk to the financial system.
When the banking sector is holding a significant proportion of government securities,
and there is a negative shock to the government financial position, it can have a
detrimental impact on the banks. The government's implicit guarantee is also likely to
increase. This, in turn, makes the government's financial position worse, creating a
compounding effect, which may result in the government's failure to honour its
guarantee obligations and cause a collapse of the banking system.
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Government

The impact of decline in government assets results in lower value of sovereign debt in
the case where there is a sharp decline in government assets relative to its distress
barriers. If the banking sector were to have a large portion of its assets in government
debt, a vicious circle could arise, when the lower value of government securities
lowers bank assets, and raises the implicit financial guarantee, which in turn, lowers
government assets further. In some situations, this vicious circle can spiral out of
control, eventually resulting in the inability of the government to provide sufficient
guarantees to banks, and leading to a systemic financial crisis.

II.3.4

Risk Transmission from the Pension System to the Government

The financial distress related to pension plans can result in the transmission of risk to the
government.
Pension

Government

One example is the case when a pension system's assets contain corporate sector
equity (in a defined benefit plan, which has an implicit government guarantee). A
decline in corporate assets would cause the corporate equity value to drop. This, in
turn, would increase the government guarantee to the pension system and the
implicit guarantee to banks.

II.3.5

Risk Transmission from the Public Sector to Holders of public Sector Debt

Fiscal, banking, and other problems can cause distress for the government, which can
transmit risk to holders of government debt.
Public sector

Debt holders

Holders of foreign currency debt have a claim on the value of the debt minus the
potential credit loss, which is dependent on the level of assets of the public sector (in
foreign currency terms) compared to the foreign currency default barrier.

II.4
II.4.1

Financial Market Components and Interrelationships
Components of Financial Markets

Financial markets bring participants together, discover prices, facilitate exchanges
and disseminate information regarding products and prices. Accordingly, markets are
communication networks among participants. As networks, they are constantly
evolving to find more efficient ways to accomplish their functions. What causes these
networks to be formed and constantly modified is the profit motive of participants.
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The organisational structure of financial markets is made up of three categories,
namely; the markets for financial services, the markets for securities and the markets
for derivatives financial infrastructures. This categorisation is based on three major
needs for financial markets – the need for financial services such as funding and
making payments, the need for liquidity and the need for risk management. All these
major categories and their components operate together in what is called the
Financial System. Financial markets, therefore, are a system of interconnected, yet
differentiated markets as described below:
·
Markets for financial services are the “product” markets in finance.
Institutions and firms in these markets identify the needs of consumers and
offer the appropriate products. These services assist with borrowing,
lending, investing, making payments, and managing financial risks.
Interaction between firms and consumers determines the types of
services offered and set their prices.
·
Markets for securities are the “exchange” markets in finance. Securities are
negotiable financial instruments such as stocks and bonds, which may be
exchanged among investors. Trading in securities markets sets the market
prices and expected yields of securities, and indirectly, the yields on nonnegotiable financial instruments such as bank loans and non-negotiable
bank deposits.
·
Markets for derivative financial instruments are the “risk management”
markets in finance. Derivative instruments include financial futures and
options contracts, and other related risk management contracts. These
contracts are termed derivative instruments because their existence and
value derives from some underlying security, like a U.S. Treasury bond.
Derivative instruments are not themselves securities, but simply contracts
to exchange securities assist in managing the risk of unexpected changes
in the future price of securities. The markets for derivative financial
instruments create and exchange positions in these instruments and set
their prices.
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Figure 7: Financial Market Components and Interrelationships

Source: William Scott- 1991.

II.4.2

Interrelationships among Financial Markets

The markets for financial services are the controlling forces among the three market
components (see figure 7). In the “product” markets, firms offer financial services to
consumers for a profit. This sets up the interaction among the three component
markets.
Financial services firms use securities markets to create services for consumers and
earn profit from dealing in these markets. They establish and maintain organised
exchanges and trading networks in order to offer their customers access to open
market financing (securities issues) and trading in securities (securities brokerage).
Financial services firms also use securities markets for their own profit. For instance,
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banks acquire bonds in securities markets, which they hold as earning assets, and
securities firms trade in securities markets to earn profit as principals.
Financial services firms use derivative markets to create services for their customers
and earn further profits. They have input into the creation of new types of financial
futures and options contracts and so help their clients who trade on futures and
option exchanges. Some financial services firms use derivatives markets to earn
profits. For example, securities firms use computerised trading schemes to gain riskless
profits from positions in both derivative and securities markets.

II.4.3 Economic Functions of Financial Markets
Financial markets are different from most other types of markets, since they have
macroeconomic as well as microeconomic functions. Most real goods and services
markets have principally microeconomic functions: producing, pricing, and
distributing goods and services. Financial markets have macroeconomic functions
as well as microeconomic functions. These markets create nation's money supply, set
interest rates in the economy, and evoke financial flows that determine the course of
economic growth. As a result, dealing in financial markets can become challenging
and perplexing. Dealing in other types of markets, for example, does not involve
outguessing the current monetary policy of the CBN and the interest rate and foreign
exchange policies of central banks in other jurisdictions.

II.4.3.1 Microeconomic Functions
Microeconomics refers to the economic forces that bring about the production and
exchange of goods and services, and set their prices. The microeconomic functions
of financial markets include producing financial services and facilitating financial
flows.
·Producing Financial Services: Like goods and services markets, financial
markets produce and sell services that serve the needs of the economy.
These services are largely associated with borrowing, investing,
managing risks, and making payments and financial transactions.
·Facilitating Financial Flows: Through offering services, financial markets
are able to gather and package the savings of individuals and groups in
society and transfer these funds to profitable business ventures and
socially beneficial public investments. Interest rates and security prices
serve as signals that cause financial markets to allocate savings for their
most productive use in the economy.
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II.4.3.2 Macroeconomic Functions
Macroeconomics refers to the economic forces that affect national income,
employment, prices and productive capacity. The macroeconomic functions of
financial markets are to create money and financial capital.
·
Creating Money: Banks and other depository institutions operating in
financial markets create transactable deposits that serve as money.
Instead of tendering cash for payments, depositors may issue cheques
on their accounts in depository institutions. The payments system involves
interrelationships among depository institutions that clear cheques and
move funds from those who pay to those who receive. Payments services
are the means that depository institutions use to help their customers
make payments, such as cashier's cheques, electronic transactions, and
so on. Being paper or magnetic entries in computer systems, deposits can
be freely created to meet the monetary needs of the economy. The rate
at which money is created directly influences the macroeconomic
performance of the economy. Therefore, central banks are empowered
to control the money-creating ability of the banking system.
·
Creating Financial Capital: A nation must create real capital to experience
economic growth and increase the standard of living of its citizens. Real
capital is defined to include productive real assets such as machinery,
plant, equipment, real estate, and direct ownership of physical business
assets. Real capital allows efficient production and saves the time and
effort of both employees and management. By possessing current
technology, real capital is responsible for the increased production of
goods and services. Business invests in real capital to gain returns from
selling the goods and services that are efficiently produced and made
available to consumers. Financial markets create financial capital to
assist the development of real capital. Financial capital is simply financial
instruments that provide investors with an indirect means to share in the
returns generated by real capital. For example, when an automobile
plant makes money from manufacturing and selling cars, this return can
be passed on to investors in the form of bond interest and dividends on
common stocks (e.g., returns on financial instruments). Investors need not
directly own the car plant, and instead may own a claim upon its cash
returns.
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Figure 8: Financial Intermediaries

Financial Intermediaries

A. Deposit Institutions
(Banks)
i. Commercial Banks
ii. Savings and Loans
Associations
iii.

Mutual Savings Banks

iv.

Credit Unions

B. Contractual Savings Institutions
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Life Insurance Companies

ii.

Fire and Casualty Insurance
companies

iii.

Pension Funds (private) and
state and local retirement funds

C. Investment Intermediaries
i. Finance Companies
ii. Mutual Funds
iii.

Money Markey Mutual Funds

Ownership of financial paper presents investors with more flexibility than ownership of
real capital. Financial instruments can be divided into small-denomination units,
which can be easily transferred and sold; structured to manage risk in accordance
with investors' needs; and have other attributes that make the instruments more
attractive. Accordingly, the creation of financial capital encourages saving and
investing and facilitates the formation of real capital in modern economics. Financial
instruments allow investors to own a part of an enterprise for as long as they desire. For
example, it is not necessary to own the whole car plant forever, to gain the returns it
generates for owners.
Figure 9: Financial Instruments

Financial Instruments

A.

Money Market Instruments

B.

Capital Market Instruments

i. Treasury bills

i. Stocks

ii. Negotiable bank certificate of deposits

ii. Mortgages

iii.

Banks Acceptance

iii. Government securities

iv. Repurchase Agreements (RPs)

iv. Government Agency Securities

v. Federal (Fed) Funds

v. State and Local Government Bonds

vi. Eurodollars

vi. Consumer and Commercial Bank loans
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II.5
Monetary Policy and the Financial Markets: The Transmission
Mechanism
Monetary policy is the act of increasing or decreasing the nation's money stock to
influence the national economy. Monetary policy is implemented in an effort to
achieve specific goals for the nation. The policy operates by having central banks
employ financial tools, which have direct effect on the financial markets. Therefore,
participants in the financial markets seek to formulate financial strategies that
anticipate the outcomes of monetary policy on financial markets.
The transmission mechanism is the channel of monetary influence on economic
activity and is used for policy analysis by central banks. The transmission mechanisms
(channels) fall into three categories: namely, those operating through investment
spending, through consumer expenditure, and through international trade. (see
figure 10)
i.
Investment Spending: According to Modigliani (1998), interest rate may not
be the only driving factor for investment spending. The model discovered
other factors such as credit rationing, prices of common stocks and net worth
of firms.
a.
Credit Rationing: When monetary policy is restrictive, bankers might start to
ration loans to their customers instead of allowing the interest rate on these
loans to rise, that is, they would not make loans available at the stated interest
rate. An expansionary monetary policy might then increase the quantity of
available loans, causing investment spending to rise, even though interest
rates do not have much of a measurable decline systematically, the
monetary policy effects is:

Money (M ) 
®
Loans 
®
Investment (I) 
®
Income (Y) 
b.

Monetary Policy can also affect investment spending through its effects on
the prices of common stock. Tobin (1969) developed a theory of the link
between stock prices and investment spending, referred to as Tobins q theory.
Tobin defines q as follows:

Market Value of Firms
q=
Replacement Cost of Capital
If q is high, the market price of firms is high relative to the replacement cost of capital,
and new plant and equipment capital is cheap relative to the market value of
business of firm. Companies can then issue stock and get a high price for it relative to
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the cost of the plant and equipment they are buying. Thus, investment spending will
rise because firms can buy a lot of new investment goods with only small issue of stock.
The reverse is the case when q is low. The implication of this is that when money supply
increases, the public finds it has more money than it wants and so gets rid of it through
spending. One place the public spends is in the stock market, increasing the demand
for stocks and consequently raises their prices. Combining this with the fact that higher
stock prices (Ps) will lead to a higher q and thus higher investment spending (I) lead to
the following transmission mechanism of the monetary policy:

M 
®
Ps 
®
q
®
I
®
Y
c.

Networth Firms: The higher the networth of firms, the less severe are adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. Higher networth means that lenders in
effect have more collateral for their loans, and so losses from adverse
selection are reduced. A rise in networth which reduces the adverse selection
problem, thus encourages lending to finance investment spending. A rise in
stock prices raises the networth of firms and so leads to higher investment
spending because of the reduction in adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. Thus

M
®
Ps 
®
Adverse Selection & Moral Hazard ¯
®
Loans 
®
I
®
Y
ii.

Consumer Expenditure: The link between monetary policy and consumer
expenditure are divided in three areas: interest rate effect on consumer
durable expenditure, wealth effects and liquidity effects:

a.

Interest rate effects on consumer durable expenditure: The lower interest
rates, which lower the cost of financing these expenditures would encourage
consumers to increase their consumption of durable goods. The resulting
channel of monetary policy influence on aggregate demand is as follows:

M
®
I
®
Consumer durable expenditure 
®
Y
b.

Financial Wealth Effects: This considers how the balance sheet of a consumer
might affect his spending decisions. An important component of a consumers
lifetime resources, which determine his consumption spending is his financial
wealth, a major component of which is common stocks. When stock prices
rise, the value of financial wealth increases, thus increasing the lifetime
resources of consumers and consumption. Thus, the monetary transmission
mechanism is as follows:

M
®
Ps 
®
Wealth 
®
Life time resources 
®
Consumption 
®
Y
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Liquidity Effects: When consumers have a lot of financial assets relative to their
debts (which implies highly liquid balance sheet), their estimate of the
possibility of financial distress is low, and they will be more willing to purchase
consumer durables. Thus, when stock prices rise, the value of financial assets
rise as well, consumer durable expenditure will also rise which leads to the
following transmission mechanism for monetary policy:

M
®
Ps 
®
Value of Financial Assets 
®
Likelihood of Financial Distress ¯
®
Consumer Durable Expenditure 
®
Y
iii.

International Trade: With the growing internationalisation of the economy
and the advent of flexible exchange rate, an exchange rate effect on net
experts has become an important monetary transmission mechanism.
When domestic interest rates fall (with inflation unchanged), domestic
savings (deposits) become less attractive relative to deposits denominated in
foreign currencies. The result is a fall in the value of dollar deposits relative to
other currency deposits, that is, a fall in the exchange rate (denoted by E). The
lower value of the domestic currency makes domestic goods cheaper than
foreign goods thereby causing a rise in net exports and hence in aggregate
output. The monetary transmission mechanism operating through
international trade is thus

M
®
I
®
E¯
®
NX 
®
Y
Figure 11: The Link between Money and GNP - Monetary Transmission Mechanisms

Source: Frederics S. Mishkin, 1992.
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Interactions between Monetary Policy and the Financial System

Monetary policy is the act of increasing or decreasing the nation's money supply to
move the economy towards growth and stable places. The CBN, which is the
principal regulator of the nation's money supply, utilises financial markets to conduct
monetary policy. When the Bank conducts monetary policy, it influences the
behavior of depository financial institutions operating in the market, financial services,
as well as interest rates and the value of financial instruments. Thus, monetary policy
decisions can influence the financial sector by influencing the risk-taking behavior of
financial sector participants. Monetary policy can affect such behavior in three ways:
(i) by affecting the overall level of leverage in the economy. (ii) by affecting the
maturity structure of financial liabilities and (iii) by changing attitudes held by those in
the financial sector about assuming risk.
A monetary policy designed to reduce growth in the money supply has a direct effect
on financial markets. With less money (which implies less credit), interest rates rise and
security prices fall in secondary markets. Therefore, a restrictive monetary policy has
the potential to reduce availability of funds in credit markets and increase borrowing
costs, decrease the value of investment portfolios, raise the interest cost of liabilities
(deposits) of financial institutions if asset yields are more sensitive to changing market
rates than liability costs or decrease the lending spreads of financial institutions. If
asset yields are less sensitive to changing market rates than are liability costs, and
reduces the liquidity of financial institutions as their financial assets fall in value. The
substantial decline in lending will lead to a substantial decline in investment and
aggregate economic activity.
On the other hand, expansionary monetary policies have the opposite effect. Interest
rates fall and the prices of securities increase. Therefore, more funds are available to
credit markets and borrowing costs decrease; the values of investment portfolios
increase; the cost of liabilities of financial institution falls; if liability cost adjust more
quickly than asset yields, the earning speeds of financial institutions increases and
vice versa; and the liquidity of financial institutions increases.
Table 2: Effects of monetary policy upon financial markets

Policy

Credit

Market

Security

availability

rates

prices

Lending
spread

Liquidity of
AR<LC

AR>LC

financial
Institutions

Contractionary Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Increase

Decrease

Decrease

Expansionary

Decrease

Increase

decrease

Increase

Increase

Increase

Note: AR= Interest Sensitivity of Asset Returns; LC=Interest Sensitivity of Liability costs.
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1.

As Smaghi (2011) noted, the bulk of deposits for financial institutions, whether
banks, broker-dealers, the so-called shadow banking system on hedge funds,
is very much short-term. For example, broker-dealers fund themselves primarily
in the repo market, mainly at overnight maturities while shadow banks fund
themselves in the commercial paper market and the majority of the
commercial banks rely on retail finance – chequeing and saving deposits –
which usually consists of sight or short-maturity instruments. Wholesale funding
for commercial banks is typically very short-term as well. So, when a central
bank decides on the short-term interest rate, it directly affects the marginal
price of leverage for virtually the entire financial sector. The problem arises
when, due to low interest rates that make short-term funding cheap, the total
debt raised by financial institutions goes beyond what may be considered
socially optimal.

2.

Low funding rates can inspire risky business strategies. For example, extreme
forms of maturity transformation can be attractive, particularly if the risk
adjustment calculus fails to make proper correction for the expected gains. In
the search for higher nominal return on investment, financial institutions might
be encouraged to buy assets typically with long-term maturity and possibility
illiquid, financing them with short-term liabilities, thus, generating a large
maturity and liquidity mismatch.

3.

There is evidence that low short term interest rates induce banks to lend to
borrowers with a poor credit history, or none at all. Low short-term interest rate
policies generate an inflow of borrowers, which may reduce the probability of
systemic financial distress. This is the negative aspects of the expansionary
phases of the business cycle, periods during which more firms may be seeking
credit. In this scenario, the proportion of unknown borrowers (or projects) in the
market increases. The arguments is that banks may respond to the increased
proportion of unknown borrowers by reducing their lending standards and
expanding credit, which increases aggregate surplus but also increases the
probability of a banking crises.

II.8

Financial System Stability and Monetary Policy

The goals of financial stability policies can be broadly defined as:
(I)
Preserving the stability of the financial system by reducing the pro-cyclicality
of the financial sector; and
(ii)
Improving its resilience to adverse shocks.
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In order to achieve these objectives, the main tools used are those that tame procyclicality and those that improve resilience of the financial sector. The main tool
used to tame pro-cyclicality is the counter-cyclical capital buffer. The main idea of
counter-cyclical capital buffer is to encourage banks to build up more capital per
unit of risk during the uprising well above the minimum requirements mandated by
micro-prudential supervision. This way credit would become more expensive during
the upswing and therefore might slowdown. Also, banks would not need to reduce
the loan supply during the downswing since they could run down this buffer before
reaching the binding constraint of capital regulation. This instrument aims to limit
supply-driven credit expansions, which may retard economic recovery.
The other tool for taming pro-cyclicality is a ceiling on the loan-to-value ratio for
collaterised loans, which is designed for demand-driven credit booms, By forcing the
borrower to put up more to its own funds, it makes credit more expensive and reduces
demand. When the demand for loan heats up, the loan-to-value ratio can be
decreased, thus, increasing the cost and slowing down or stopping its growth.
The tools that increase resilience of the financial system are also divided into two
categories, namely: those that strengthen institutions; and those that seek to change
the structure of the industry. The first category includes levies on Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). The second category is market reforms such as
a drive towards centralizing exchanges and structural reforms aimed at separating
commercial banking from other activities.
Centralising transactions should reduce counter party risk and allow a better
monitoring of financial flows, especially of derivatives, for which little data is available
in general. The concentration of transactions also reduces uncertainty about who
holds what – an uncertainty which, during a crisis, can end up freezing the entire
markets and forcing central banks to intervene. Thus, the development of central
clearing counter parties (CCPs) seem beneficial to the conduct of monetary policy.
The separation of commercial banking from other activities helps to protect deposit
holders by insulating them from excessive risk-taking activities of banks. Such
separation would reshape the financial industry and affect the transmission channels
of monetary policy.
A lot of weight (pressure) is put on monetary policy tools during a crisis. In order to
decrease such pressure, we use macro-prudential policies that reduce liquidity risk ex
ante.
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II.8.1 Macro-financial Linkages and Systemic Risks
Systemic risk is the risk of a crisis in the financial sector and its spillover to the economy
at large. Specifically, systemic risk can be broadly thought of as the failure of a
significant part of the financial sector leading to a reduction in credit availability that
has the potential to adversely affect the real economy.
Systemic risks arise because of the inter-linkages between the financial sector and the
macro-economy and between financial institutions and markets. Systemic risks arise
because of externalities between institutions- the risks of a given firm increase
because of decisions made by other players. As these risks cumulate, they can pose a
threat to the whole system through spillover and contagion effects. For instance,
liquidity crisis can lead to downward pressure on asset prices, thereby impacting the
entire market. In addition, the fact that some institutions are two big to fail, creates a
bias towards firms that are too large and too highly leveraged, and have too much
counterparty risk.
II.8.2 The Nature of the Externality of Systemic Risk
Systemic risk arises from externalities between institutions. By its very nature, systemic
risk is a negative externality imposed by each financial firm on the system. Each
individual firm is clearly motivated to prevent its own collapse but not the collapse of
the system as a whole. So when a firm considers holding large amounts of illiquid
securities, or concentrate its risk into particular ones (e.g. subprime – based assets), or
puts high amounts of leverage on its books (as a way to drive up excess returns), its
incentive is to manage its own risk/return trade-off and does not take into account the
spillover risk it imposes on other financial institutions. The spillover risk arises as one
institutions trouble triggers liquidity spirals (see fig 12), leading to depressed asset
prices and a hostile funding environment that pull others down and then lead to
further price drops, funding illiquidity, and so on.
Another externality comes from the rescue of failed institutions. When banks fail
individually, other healthy banks can readily buy them or otherwise take up most of
their lending and related activities. Thus, real losses primarily arise when banks fail
together and this collective failure cannot be readily resolved.
The suggested approach to financial externality is to give financial institutions an
incentive to internalise this negative externality through taxes and surcharges. By
doing so, banks are given incentives to limit their contributions to systemic risk.
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Figure 12: Liquidity Spirals – Financial linkage

Source: Brunner Meser Pedersen, Garleany (2007).

II.8.3 Systemic Risk Implications of Financial Linkages
i.
Interconnectedness and Large Complex Financial Institutions
One of the most pervasive ways in which systemic risk manifests itself is through the
too-interconnected-to-fail problem. The creation of large, complex financial
institutions (LCFIs) engaged in some combination of commercial banking,
investment banking, asset management, and insurance has led to stronger
interconnections, innovation and growth. The operations of these LCFIs transcend
national boundaries and engage in such activities as extensive interbank contracts,
over-the-counter derivatives, equity, bond, and syndicated loan issuance, and
trading activities globally.
While these interdependence can increase the efficiency of the global financial
system by smoothing credit allocation and risk diversification, they have also
increased potential for cross-market and cross-border disruptions to spread swiftly. In
addition, financial innovation, such as derivatives and securitisation, have enabled
risk transfers that were not fully recognised by financial regulators and institutions
themselves, and have complicated the assessment of counterparty risk, risk
management, and policy response.
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Interconnectedness means that difficulties in rolling over liabilities may spill over to
financial system as a whole. Also, rollover risk associated with short-term liabilities is
present not only in the banking sector, but equally importantly, in the non-banking
financial sub-sector.
Factors that encouraged the development of LCFIs include the introduction of the
universal banking regime, which expanded not only banks' powers to enter into
securities services, but also their ability to enter into insurance and other financial
services businesses, and vice versa. As a result, banks moved vigorously to build
significant market share in investment banking, while certain large insurance
companies acquired investment banking units to engage in capital market activities.
Large scale mergers and acquisitions also contributed to the creation of LCFIs.
Furthermore, like their investment banking competitors, commercial banks
increasingly relied on proprietary trading revenues as competitive pressure eroded
intermediation margins. Some also expanded off-balance-sheet activities in swaps
and other derivatives as well as special purpose, off-balance-sheet structured
investment vehicles (SIVs) as a perceived profitable way of circumventing regulatory
capital requirements and expanding their overall leverage.
Figure 13: The Complexity of Large Complex Financial Institution
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II.8.4 Approaches to Assessing Implications of Financial Sector Systemic Linkages
There are four complimentary approaches used in assessing financial sector systemic
linkages. These are:
·
The network approach: This approach relies primarily on institutional data to
assess network externalities. Network analysis, which can track the
reverberation of a credit event or liquidity squeeze throughout the system via
direct link in the interbank market, can provide important measures of
financial institutions' resilience to the domino effects triggered by financial
distress.
·
The co-risk model: This methodology draws from market data, but focuses on
assessing systemic linkages at an institutional level. Such linkages may arise
from common risk factors such as business models or accounting valuation
practices.
·
The distress dependence matrix: This matrix is based on market data, but
instead of looking at bilateral relationships as above, the pair wise conditional
probabilities of distress presented are estimated using a composite timevarying multivariate distribution that captures linear (correlation) and
nonlinear interdependence among a set of financial institutions.
·
The default intensity model: Based on historical default data, this
methodology focuses on the time-series properties of banking defaults data
to assess systemic linkages. It measures the probability of failures of a large
fraction of financial institutions (default clustering) due to both direct and
indirect systemic linkages.
Each approach by itself has considerable limitations, but together the approaches
provide an important set of surveillance tools and the basis for policies to address the
too-connected-to-fail problem.
II.8.5 The Problem of Common Exposure
One major concern of interconnectedness is the problem of common exposure.
When many institutions have an exposure to the same specific risk factor, it can make
the system vulnerable to a shock to that factor. Also, intermediaries may be directly
exposed to a frail institution through financial contracts. They may be exposed to
indirectly and unknowingly, through their counterparts, who themselves are directly
exposed to frail institutions. All institutions may also be vulnerable to the same
underlying risk. The problem of common exposure may be related to the size of the
institution. Large intermediaries usually are more interconnected, so they are typically
a greater source of systemic risk.
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II.8.6 The Fall of Bear Steans, Lehman and AIG
II.8.6.1 A Case of Systemic Interconnectedness and Size
Bear Stearns had substantive systemic risk. Though, Bear Stearns was the smallest of
the major investment banks, it had a high degree of interconnectedness to other
parts of the financial system. In other words, it was a major counterparty risk. For
example, as a major player in the US$2.5 trillion repo market, which is the primary
source of short-term funding of security purchases, bankruptcy would have meant
that the typical lenders in these markets – money market mutual funds and
municipalities – would have received collateral rather than cash for their investment.
Since some of this collateral was illiquid, it is quite possible that these lenders would
have to pull their funds from other institutions, sparking a run on the financial system.
In fact, in the week leading up to the date of Bear's collapse, Lehman Brothers' fiveyear CDS spread rose from 285 basis points to 450 basis points in anticipation of a run.
Also, Bear Stearns was the leading prime broker on the Wall Street to hedge funds.
Failure of Bear Stearns would have put at risk any hedge fund securities
hypothecated at the firm. Depending on the outcome of the failure, hedge funds
might pull assets from other financial institutions that faced even slight bankruptcy
risk, again leading to a run on the financial system and failures of other financial
institutions. Further, Bear Stearns was a major participant in the credit default swap
(CDS) market. Bankruptcy of Bear Stearns would have meant the closing out of all
outstanding CDS contracts. Again, depending on how these contracts were netted
out within the system, a number of these CDS contracts would have to be liquidated
given the nature of the illiquidity of CDS contracts, the fire sales of these CDS could
have had a ripple effect across the financial system.
II.8.6.2
Lehman Brothers
Over the weekend following Friday, September 12, the government failed in its
attempt to engineer a purchase of Lehman Brothers by other financial institutions
without any direct government support. In hindsight, Lehman Brothers contained
considerable systemic risk and led to the near collapse of the U.S. financial system
(though that may have occurred regardless). Ex-post, it is not clear whether: the
government thought Lehman was no longer systemic because of the Fed's opening
of lending facilities to financial institutions, or as the government now argues,
Lehman could not be rescued because Lehman did not have adequate collateral
to post to access these facilities. In any event, similar to Bear Stearns, Lehman was a
major player in various parts of the capital market. Its bankruptcy opened up the
possibility that similar firms could also go bankrupt, causing a potential run on their
assets. This led to Merill Lynch selling itself to Bank of America. The other two
institutions, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, saw the cost of their five-year CDS
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protection rose from 250 and 200 basis points (bps) to 500 and 350 bps, respectively,
from Friday, September 12, to Monday, September 15. Both of these institutions filed
for bank holding company status soon after.
II.8.6.3
American International Group (AIG)
As yet another example of possible systemic risk, consider the government's injection
of funds into AIG on September 15. AIG received an US$85billion loan secured against
all its assets, including its insurance subsidiaries, as a way to meet the collateral
obligations of its US$400 billion portfolio of credit default swaps (CDSs) against a
variety of higher tranches of collaterised debt obligations (CDOs) and collaterised
loan obligation (CLOs) of mortgages, bonds, and loans. AIG posed two forms of
systemic risk. The first was that its exposure to CDSs was all on one side – the firm was
receiving small premium to insure against large, yet highly unlikely, losses. Of course,
the unlikely event that losses would occur would be systemic in nature, causing the
CDSs to be highly correlated in these states. AIG would then have to look over large
amounts of capital it would not have access to at the parent level. As this systemic
event became even slightly likely, AIG's counterparts demanded collateral to protect
themselves against further declines, caused AIG to be strapped for funds. As it
became clear AIG could no longer post collateral, AIG's forced bankruptcy would
mean that US$400 billion worth of securities on other financial institutions' balance
sheets would no longer be safely insured, leading to substantial write-offs, which in
turn, would cause a fire sale of assets that could ripple across the financial system. At
the very least, the insurance market for financial claims could freeze up.
III.

Implications of Macro-financial Linkages for Monetary and Financial System
Stability
III.1
The Emerging Framework for Financial Stability
The goals of monetary policy include:
Economic growth, price stability, interest rate stability, stability in the financial
markets, and stability in the foreign exchange markets.
On the other, the goal of financial stability policy is the stable provision of financial
intermediation services to the wider economy which include: payment services,
credit intermediation and assurance against risk. Financial stability polices seek to
avoid the type of boom and bust cycle in the supply of credit and liquidity, which
usually lead to severe financial crisis. In other words, financial stability policies seek to
increase the resilience of the financial system.
With respect to these goals, macro-financial linkages pose a basic challenge to
policy makers: should the policy makers be concerned more with protecting the
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banks (financial institutions) from the credit cycle or protecting the real economy from
the banks. The resilience of the banking system affects the supply of credit, which in
turn, affects the economic conditions influencing loan delinquencies and defaults.
Based on the emerging framework for financial stability (figure 15), while the primary
responsibility of the financial system needs to rest with macro-prudential policy, other
policies are required to complement it. No matter how different policy mandates are
structured, addressing financial stability and systemic risk is a common responsibility.
Prominent role can be played by micro-prudential and monetary policies, both of
which impact on the cost of risk in the financial system and the economy. The larger
the buffers created by the former, the smaller the need for macro-prudential policy to
step in. Other policy areas such as accounting standards, corporate governance,
disclosure, and crises management and resolution frameworks are required to work
together with macro-prudential policies to achieve the desired stability in the financial
system. Indeed, it is important to underline that macro-prudential policy cannot
substitute for sound policies, involving, in particular strong micro-prudential regulation
and supervision, and sound macroeconomic policies.
Figure 15: Financial Stability Framework and Macro-prudential Policy

Source: Brockmeijer et al., 2011.
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III.2
Policy Responses to Address Macro-financial Risks
As we have seen from the analysis in the foregoing sections, macro-financial linkages
are major sources of financial instability through contagion and spillover effects. Due
to macro-financial linkages, vulnerability and excess built-up in financial markets and
institution can affect the wider economy, with sometimes devastating results. By the
same token, the health of the financial sector can be severely tested by
developments elsewhere in the economy. In fact, these two-way macro-financial
linkages all too often create potentially dangerous feedback mechanism that
without rapid effective policy intervention can trigger deep and long-lasting
economic downturns.
Addressing systemic risk generated by macro-financial linkages requires a broad
framework of prudential tools that includes rules and mechanisms that promote
better risk management on the part of intermediaries and also reforms that reduce
the vulnerability of the financial system to the liquidation of any single financial firm.
These rules are known as macro-prudential instruments. The aims of the policies would
be to make intermediaries bear, or internalise, the costs that their behaviour imposes
on others. Some of the macro-prudential policies that have been developed recently
include:
1.
Systemic Capital Surcharge: To be effective in limiting systemic threats, a
systemic capital surcharge probably would be disproportionately larger for firms that
contribute the most to systemic risk. This way, intermediaries would have an incentive
to limit the systemic risks they create.
2.
Macro-prudential regulators could also make capital requirements vary with
the business cycle. For example, in good times, capital requirements would rise
above the long-run average to create a capital buffer against adverse shocks and to
discourage euphoria.
3.
Regulators could require banks to buy catastrophe insurance or could ask
banks issue so-called contingent convertible bonds that convert to equity in the
event of a capital shortfall.
4.
Variable risk weight: This would involve raising capital requirements against
specific types of lending. If the authorities felt financial institutions' exposure to a
certain asset class was too great, they could try to discourage it in this way.
5.
Leverage limits: This would impose an overall limit on the amount of leverage
financial institutions could hold. It would act as a “back-stop” to capital requirements
which are typically risk-weighted.
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6.
Forward-looking loss provisioning: Banks would be forced to set aside
provisions against prospective future losses on their lending. These are various ways
this could be used as a macro-prudential tool, with Spain's 'dynamic provisioning'
systemic offering a useful practical example. This system links loss provision to the
credit cycle, so banks are forced to hold higher provisions when credit is growing
strongly. Any such approach should, however, respect the integrity of international
accounting standards.
7.
Collateral Requirements: This would limit specific types of lending by imposing
higher collateral restrictions during times of unsustainable growth in their lending.,
margin requirements on stocks/purchases or the imposition of haircuts on
repurchase transactions for investment banks.
8.
Quantitative Credit Control and Reserve Requirements: These would limit
lending by imposing limits on lenders and/or increasing financial institutions' shortterm liquidity requirements. Such a system was used in the UK until the early 1980s,
although it is likely to lead to distortion if applied over an extended period.
9.
Capital Surcharge on Systemic Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs): These
include liquidity buffers, contingent capital, convertible bonds, insurance, etc.
III.3
Policy Response to Macro-financial Crises
Many divergent approaches have been proposed and tried to resolve systemic
crises more efficiently. The differences in approach reflect in part different policy
objectives which include:
i. Reducing the fiscal cost of financial crises;
ii. Limiting the economic costs in terms of lost output;
iii. Accelerating Restructuring; and
iv. Achieving long-term structural reforms.
Central to understanding a sound policy approach to financial crisis is the
recognition that policy responses that reallocate wealth toward banks and debtors
and away from taxpayers face a key trade-off. Such reallocation of wealth could
help to restraint productive investment, but they have large costs. These costs
include taxpayer's wealth that is spent on financial assurance and indirect costs from
misallocation of capital and distortion to incentives that may result from
encouraging banks and firms to abuse government protection.
In reviewing crises policy responses, it is useful to differentiate between the
containment and resolution phases of systemic restructuring. During the
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containment phase, the financial crisis is still unfolding, government tend to
implement policies aimed at restoring public confidence to minimise the
repercussion on the real sector of the loss of confidence by depositors and other
investors in the financial system. The resolution phase involves the actual financial,
and to a lesser extent operational, restructuring of financial institutions and
corporation.
Table 3: Crisis Containment and Resolution Policies
S/N

Crisis Containment Policies

S/N

Crisis Resolution Policies

1

Supervision of convertibility of
deposits, which prevent bank
depositors from seeking
repayment from banks

1

This entails the resumption of a normally
functioning credit and legal
systems, and the rebuilding of
banks’ and borrowers’ balance
sheets.

2

Regulatory capital forbearance,
which allows banks to avoid
the cost of regulatory
compliance, e.g. by allowing
banks to overstate their
equity capital to avoid the
costs of contraction in loan
supply.
Emergency liquidity support to banks

2

Government - subsidised work - outs of
distressed balance sheets.

3

Debt forgiveness.

4

A government guarantee to
depositors

4

The establishment of government
owned asset management
company (AMC) to buy the
resolved distressed loans.

5

Administrative interventions, including 5
temporary assumptions of
management powers by a
regulatory official or closure,
which may include the
subsidised compulsory sale of
a bank’s good assets to a
sound bank together with the
6
assumption by that bank of all
or most of the failed entity’s
banking liability.

3

Government - assisted sales of financial
institutions to new owners, typically
foreign.

Government assisted recapitalization of
financial institutions through injection of
funds.
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The appropriate containment policy response would depend on whether the trigger
for crisis is a loss of depositors' confidence (triggering a deposit run), regulatory
recognition of a bank's insolvency, or the knock-on effects of financial asset market
disturbances outside the banking system, including exchange rate.
IV.
Summary
1.
Financial crisis occur as a result of financial excesses in the course of the
interplay between economic and financial activities, inordinate financial market
behaviour and improper structural changes in financial markets and their
implications for official policies. Financial institutions play key intermediary roles in the
economy. They finance a variety of demanders of credit. When they perform this roles
as intermediaries well, our economy and society benefit. When they perform below
expectations, our economy and financial markets suffer, and in extreme cases, crises
may follow. Financial institutions therefore, need to balance their entrepreneurial
drive with their fiduciary responsibility. In most cases, however, this balance is not
maintained. When entrepreneurial risk becomes pervasive throughout financial
markets, a financial crisis can take hold. Structural changes in the financial markets
encourage excessive risk taking. Therefore, regulators should continually change
how they supervise financial markets accordingly.
2.
The credit intermediation service of banks is the main linkage of the financial
sector to the real economy, while the money supply tool is the major linkage of the
monetary sector to the financial sector. Also, the off-balance sheets transactions, the
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits are the linkage between the
traditional banking and shadow banking sectors. The separation of commercial
banks from investment banking activities reduces the linkage between the regulated
and unregulated (or less regulated) sector and in turn reduces the counterparty risk
externality that can affect economy-wide intermediaries. It reduces ex post pressure
o regulator to bail out even unregulated institution by rendering them systemically less
imported (that is, not too intermediated to fail). The separation is a possible why of
insulating the payments and settlement system from securities activities.
3.
Monetary policies can affect systemic risk through a number of channels. First
monetary policy has a direct effect on asset prices for obvious reason that interest
rates represent the opportunity costs of holding assets. Indeed, an important element
of the monetary mechanism works through the asset price channel. In theory, an
increase in asset price induced by a decline in interest rates should not cause asset to
keep escalating in bubble – like fashion. But if bubbles develop, perhaps because of
an onset of excessive optimism, and, especially if the bubbles are financed by debt,
the result may be a build-up of systemic risk. Second, accommodative monetary
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policy could provide mechanism for a build-up of leverage and excessive risk taking in
the financial system.
4.
Macro-prudential intervention might also have macroeconomic spill-overs.
For example, rigorous enforcement of supervisory standards for capital following realestate related loan losses may slow the economy's recovery from a recession. The
need for more stringent bank capital and liquidity requirements imposed by macroprudential tools to stem systemic risk could lead to high unemployment. This type of
spill-over cannot be offset by monetary policy.
In the light of the above, macro-prudential and monetary policy should be closely
coordinated. The central bank has an important role to play in this coordination task
for good reasons. The central bank has long experience in supervision, broad
knowledge of financial markets, and an understanding of the linkages between
financial markets and the economy. In addition, the insights derived from central
bank's supervisory role benefit the conduct of monetary policy.
For effectiveness, the pursuit of macro-prudential supervision should involve other
regulated agencies, other than the central bank. There are important reasons for this
approach. First, systemic risk surveillance will benefit from the perspective of regulators
with different windows on the financial system. Second, central bank independence
in the conduct of monetary policy is widely accepted as vital to achieving optimal
employment and price stability. So it is possible to attain good outcomes by carrying
out monetary policy and macro-prudential policy separately and independently with
the goals of each pursued using separate tool kits. It must be understood that fully
optional policy generally calls for coordination between the two policies, especially
when spill-over occurs.
5.
Financial linkages and the problem of moral Hazard: Due to the linkages and
interconnectedness of large complex financial institutions, they secure government
support in case of crisis because of the too-connected-to-fail problem. This leads to
moral hazard behaviour (undue risk-taking) by financial market participants.
V.
Recommendations
1.
There is need to prevent institutions from becoming too connected to fail: The
recent financial crisis underscored the problem of an institution that is too connected
to be allowed to fail because it is linked to many other financial institutions. The demise
of such an institution could thus trigger catastrophic failures within the financial sector
and probably in other sectors of the economy. The growing complexity and
globalisation of financial services can contribute to economic growth by smoothing
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credit allocation and risk diversification, but they can also exacerbate the tooconnected-to fail problem.
2.
Pre-emptive not reactionary policy action: At the wake of every financial crisis,
policy makers across the globe try to outpace each other in the roll out of a new set of
regulations to deal with the smoking gun. Even in the face of new hopes and then
eventual recovery, this post-mortem approach means that we are often left with
irredeemable casualties. There is need for early identification and assessment of
systemic risks. This requires identifying and measuring systemic risk in a forward –
looking way in order to support improved policy judgments. New regulations must be
forward-looking and must provide adequate cover for all foreseeable risks. In the
absence of that, whistle blowers must blow it loud and clear for all to hear when it
should be heard-before the fall. Let me state that this is not in any way, an easy task.
The understanding of systemic risk and the fault like in the structure of the financial
system that makes it prone to instability or failure is still incomplete. Moreso, there is still
limitation in the analytical tools. So the challenges are formidable and require an all
hands approach. Regulators must develop a comprehensive proposal for regulatory
reforms that will restore confidence in the integrity of the financial system. A passion for
unhealthy returns will drive us to the point of detrimental risks. There should be less
emphasis on aggressive revenue growth and a focus on risk-adjusted profitability.
3.
Fuller and more transparent disclosure levels: Regulatory oversight in Nigeria
capable of preventing any systemic failure currently exists only in the Banking and
Pension sectors, while Investment Banks and Insurance companies are relatively
exposed. However, had the CBN adopted more robust disclosure standards on prior
to the crisis, we might have averted our own version of the crisis. The disclosure levels in
the Nigerian financial space lags behind acceptable international standards. We
strongly support increased transparency, including all efforts to make financial
products easily understood by both consumers and investors. Transparency also can
be increased by the use of public enforcement tools such as cease and desist orders
and the use of public rulemaking powers to prohibit specific practices or product
features deemed unfair or deceptive. The poor disclosure levels and abuse of insider
information in the Nigerian capital market encourages price manipulation, round
tripping and often triggers panicky sell-offs. The abuse of insider information currently
operates as the norm rather than the exception. The control of insider abuse should be
placed at the fore-front and not be relegated as a non-issue. An efficient market
should operate at some optimum levels at the transparency and disclosure levels of
information and this should be available to all market participants.
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4.
Separation of Traditional Banking and Shadow Banking: We are aware of the
adverse role of linkages from the unregulated sector to the regulated sector, that is,
from the shadow banking sector to the traditional banking sector. The separation of
the commercial banks from investment banking activities reduces the linkage
between the regulated and unregulated sector (investment banks), and in turn
reduces the counterparty risk externality that can affect economy-wide credit
intermediation. It also reduces ex post pressure on regulators to bail out even
unregulated institutions by rendering them systemically less important (that is, not too
interconnected to fail). The separation is a possible way of insulating the payments
and settlement system from securities activities.
5.
Capital surcharges based on systemic linkages, limit on institutions' exposure
and introduction of a liquidity risk insurance fund.
6.
Establish centralised clearing systems which provide a means to reduce
counter-party risk and the potential systemic implication of financial linkages.
Central clearing house internalizes the risk externality and would thus impose
efficient collateral and margin requirements on market participants. This ensures
minimal, near-zero counterparty risk on all traders. Equally important, clearing
members monitor each other, given their co-insurance arrangement.
7.
Leverage Requirement: There is need to implement an overall leverage
requirement that consolidates off-balance sheet exposures.
8.
Compensation in the financial system: Compensation systems in the
financial services industry should be aligned to the avoidance of system risk. A
practice whereby executives of financial institutions are appraised based on the
volume of credits generated (with no recognition of the quality of the credits and its
associated systemic risk implications) which encourages the executives to take
uncalculated risks, is to say the least, unacceptable. Such measures as
compensation through stock (held for longer periods) and stricter protective rules for
top management would probably make sense.
9.
Adoption of global regulatory framework - there is a need to harmonise
regulatory arbitrage between jurisdictions. Nigerian institutions have to adopt global
best practices in all aspects of their operations. The CBN's introduction of IFRS
accounting standards to bank's financial reporting is just the beginning of a long
journey. New IASB and Basel II standards in the wake of global financial crunch need
to be quickly adopted and implemented, and enforced to end the credibility crisis
created by the abuse of insider related credits. The process of conflict resolution and
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arbitration needs to be independent and enforceable to calm the nerves of foreign
and local investors.
10.
Filling information gaps on cross-market, cross-currency and cross country
linkages, to refine analysis of systemic linkages. This would require imposing additional
disclosure requirements on financial institution, access to micro-prudential data from
supervisors, more intensive contracts with private market participants, improved
comparability of cross-country data, and better sharing of information on a regular
and ad-hoc basis among regulators.
11.
Macro-financial Research/Timing: In view of the centrality of macro-financial
linkages in financial crisis events, there is need for a well-defined program of research
in macro-finance by the CBN supported by a clear and enduring commitment by the
executive management of the apex Bank. Some of the areas such research effort
should focus include: what tools to be used in response to imbalances in real estate
markets, impact of regulation of financial intermediation on the real economy, the
potential conflicts of interest between monetary policy and financial stability or
between micro-prudential supervision and financial stability, etc. Also, a detailed
look at the training and recruitment program in the microfinance area is clearly of
potential relevance.
12.
Minimising Regulatory Arbitrage: Regulation should not be narrowly focused
on a single ratio from the bank balance sheet such as capital requirement. It would
be more prudent for regulators to regularly assess individual and collective bank
health based on a variety of different aspects of their balance sheets, and indeed
based on market indicators. Additional ratios to examine should include loans-todeposit ratios, deposit-to-assets ratios, liquidity-to-assets-ratios, and so on.
13.
Additional Responsibilities for FSRCC: The FSRCC is presently charged with the
responsibility for coordinating regulatory issues among the agencies that regulate
Financial Institutions in the country. The memorandum of understanding currently
existing among the Financial Sector Regulation Coordinating Committee (FSRCC)
should be reviewed or enhanced to facilitate Consolidated Supervision.
The recommended additional responsibilities for the enlarged body are as follows:
· Maintaining a central database in respect of all the financial institutions
supervised by the different regulatory bodies with restricted access as may be
agreed in the memorandum of understanding (MOU);
· Each Regulator should establish a nodal cell at its end to facilitate information
sharing among all members of the financial services regulation coordinating
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committee (FSRCC); and
· The salient features of the outcome of the analysis done by each regulator
and any development that may require the attention of any other regulator
should be shared among regulators.
Although these measures could inspire additional demands and costs on financial
institution, however, they are far better alternatives to waiting until a crisis begins and
information become apparent as event un-fold.
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